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Under What Conditions? Including
students with learning disabilities
within Australian classrooms
TREVOR GALE
Central Queensland University, Australia
ABSTRACT In Australian schools, “inclusion” is a term that is used to challenge a previously
narrow focus on students with disabilities and their integration within and distribution amongst
“mainstream” schools and classrooms. Nevertheless, this article argues that, as a concept,
“inclusion” requires further broadening and deepening, particularly in arenas of practice, if it
is to serve the interests of all students. Informed by notions of recognitive justice, the paper
advocates rethinking inclusion to accommodate student differences in more socially just ways—
emphasising students’ contributions rather than their disabilities—and what this means for the
organisation of classrooms and schools. Within the article, research data are focused primarily
on students with learning disabilities and draw on twenty semi-structured interviews conducted
with parents and teachers across six Australian state primary and secondary schools. Three sets
of conditions are proposed as necessary for inclusive classroom and school processes: speci cally,
those that promote self-identity and respect, self expression and development and self-
determination and decision-making.
Introduction
In recent times, the term “inclusion” has been used in Australian schools to signal
a shift away from discourses of students’ de cits and/or disadvantages that have been
used to account for their learning disabilities in schools. These previous explanations
tended to position students with such disabilities as either lacking intellectual ability,
often referred to or measured in terms of their IQ, or as suffering from some social
and/or economic disadvantage, generally seen as a function of their deprived home
lives. In each case, “problem” identi cation has been a process from which stu-
dents—and the families and communities they represented—were excluded and
where the remedy for their debility was often similar: compensatory classes to help
them “catch up” and/or cope in a world in which they were likely to remain
“behind”.
In this article I argue that in order to move beyond such patronising accounts
of students with learning disabilities, and towards de nitions that are morally
defensible, inclusion needs to be conceived within a recognitive view of social justice.
Such a view is concerned with rethinking the divide between students’ de cits and
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disadvantage, which in the past has separated discussions about the causes for
students’ learning dif culties (e.g. race, gender, class) from those that point to these
dif culties as symptoms of students’ intellectual and/or physical dis/abilities. Hence,
while there is a focus in this article on disabilities and the related learning dif culties
these disabilities are seen to engender, the discussion is also located within a broader
account of issues of social justice in education. Also rethought, although it is more
implicit in this discussion, is the narrow focus on students’ disabilities that has
excluded explanations of the learning dif culties many students experience as a
consequence of their schooling.
In rethinking social justice and inclusion in these ways, I propose three sets of
conditions for their attainment: conditions of self-identity and respect, self ex-
pression and development and self-determination and decision-making. Illustrating
and informing these conditions, the paper draws on twenty semi-structured inter-
views with parents and teachers of six government primary and secondary schools in
Queensland, Australia [1]. A major aspect of this research focused on the nature of
and the extent to which social actors at the level of schools mediate government and
departmental policy (in this case, policy concerning students with learning
dif culties and/or disabilities), thereby in uencing students’ schooling. Other
aspects of the research considered the ways in which students (with dif culties/
disabilities) are conceived within schools and the language that is involved in this
construction.
In what follows, conditions of a recognitive view of social justice and inclusion
are prefaced by a brief account of other perspectives, characterised by notions of
distribution (Rawls, 1971)—informed by a consideration of individuals’ material
needs—and retribution (Carr & Hartnett, 1996)—informed by requirements to
protect individuals’ entitlements. This preface is also provided as a way of locating
students’ learning disabilities within broad discussions of social justice, arguing that
such matters should not simply be con ned to conditions that are intrinsic to
individuals.
Social Justice: a brief critique
The moral imperative to rethink social justice, and hence inclusion, begins with a
consideration of their root meanings. Douglas Lummis (1996, pp. 24–26) writes in
this way about Radical Democracy: the adjective “radical” chosen purposefully to
intensify rather than to modify the noun, to draw attention to the thing itself and to
suggest motion. Advocates of recognitive justice think similarly about inclusion, that
a radical response is required to redress its restrictive conceptions, particularly in
contexts of practice. The intent is to increase the potency of inclusion, to emphasise
issues that promote its achievement, particularly those that draw attention to actions
and not simply to the outcomes of those actions. In this inclusive sense, social justice
has been referred to as “the constant and perpetual will to render to everyone their
due” (Justinian in Isaacs, 1996, p. 42). The assumption here is that this rests on “the
equal moral worth of all persons” (Young, 1990, p. 37), although readings of
historical and contemporary contexts suggest that such assumptions are not univer-
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sally valued. Of course, political will is a necessary requirement for social justice
but it can also be subverted through a narrow understanding of what it should
encompass.
Distributive and retributive conceptions of social justice share at least three
characteristics that serve to narrow their foci in this way. First, they tend to be
concerned with people’s assets (or lack thereof) and only minimally with social
processes and procedures that (re)produce those assets. Some advocates (of the
retributive kind) even regard a regulatory focus on these actions as evidence of
injustices. Secondly, and relatedly, this static emphasis on material goods—
dubiously extended to include social goods such as opportunity, position, power and
so on—limits concern to the socially just distribution of goods and services, pat-
terned typically on statistical models: $x spent on each student in the education
system, x per cent of women represented among head teachers, and so on. Thirdly,
such “impartial” treatment at best regards all people as the same—an appeal to
hegemony that Lummis (1996, p. 26) likens to the illusion of the emperor’s new
clothes—and at worst serves to hide the assimilation of group differences by the
dominant. As Young expresses it, “the ideal of impartiality encourages the universal-
ization of the particular” (1990, p. 205). In short, the criticism of distributive and
retributive justice perspectives is that they tend to con ne their interests to economic
spheres and ignore the social and cultural politics of institutions, such as schools.
Lummis’ approach to rethinking democracy has the potential to address these
criticisms. Democracy, Lummis (1996, p. 22) notes, can be translated from its
Greek origins demos and Kratos as “people power”, but, like inclusive views of social
justice, “it describes an ideal, not a method of achieving it”. Hence, the democratic
struggle involves addressing such issues as, “Who are the people? What is power?”.
These are important questions for those who also struggle for social justice and they
require answers that recognise the validity of social and cultural groups and address
institutional processes. Informed by these acknowledgments, recognitive justice—or
“positive liberty”—advocates three conditions for social justice and the inclusion of
students with learning disabilities in classrooms: (i) the fostering of respect for
different social groups through their self-identi cation; (ii) opportunities for their
self-development and self-expression; and (iii) the participation of groups in making
decisions that directly concern them, through their representation on determining
bodies. Following Justinian’s insight (in Isaacs 1996, p. 42) that our desire for social
justice needs to be “constant and perpetual”, recognitive justice moves beyond “an
approach to social justice that gives primacy to having [to] one that gives primacy to
doing” (Young, 1990, p. 8, emphasis added).
Inclusion: recognising identity as distinct from ability
How, then, can teachers who subscribe to recognitive justice acknowledge the equal
moral worth of their students? How can they foster self-respect in their students and
facilitate positive self-identities for students from different groups? In researching
these issues, I asked parents of students with learning disabilities about the ways in
which their children are identi ed by teachers within their classrooms. I was
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interested in both how these identi cations re ect broader institutional arrange-
ments and how they found expression within the academic language of schooling.
Among several responses, one parent commented on how academic assessments are
linked with student identities and how these identities are often assigned to students
rather than developed from positive images of themselves. This was in response to
my inquiries about her daughter’s assessment as having a Level Six Intellectual
Impairment—the highest level of intellectual disability on the school’s assessment
scale—and how this featured in teachers’ understandings of who her daughter was
and her placement in their classes:
If your child is a [Level] Six the teachers go into the next room and say,
“Okay who is going to take this Level Six?” or the “nice” ones say, “Who
is going to take this child, she is a Level Six?”. That is what they see. They
don’t see who the child is.
If they said, “Who is going to take Cindy?”, that would be a different matter?
That’s right. If they put up Cindy’s name they might say, “Oh yes, I know
Cindy. She’s all right”. I know they ask who would like to take this child
because they tell me that’s what they do. It is pretty awful, but I understand
that.
It is much better to have teachers who want your child in their class?
Yes. I’d much rather have a teacher with the right attitude; if it is a teacher
that says, “I’ll take Cindy”, rather than, “I’ll take the Level Six”. Some
people have a noble attitude of, “I’ll take the [Level] Six”, and that really
gets up my nose. This charitable person.
If I was able to ask Cindy, “What does it mean to be disabled?”, what do you
think she’d say?
She knows that she has got Down’s syndrome. It is hard to know what she
thinks, [although] she is aware that she can’t do some things that the other
kids do and she is very conscious that her language is not as good as other
kids’. Her friends accept her but around other people she is really con-
scious [of her differences] and that is why she doesn’t talk to strangers very
much. Whether she considers herself as having a disability, I couldn’t say.
Her sister [Naomi], is the same [in her understanding of these things]. She
asked me the other day, “Does Cindy have a disability?” She knows that
she has Down’s syndrome. I said, “Some people in society would say that
she has”. She said, “Oh! I thought it was just people who were in wheel
chairs”. That is the concept that kids have … I would hate her [Cindy]
even knowing that [others label her as disabled]. She just thinks that she’s
Naomi’s sister and our daughter and this is her school. All of this disability
stuff and the fact that she might be excluded—she’s only 6[-years-old] so
it is above her head. Her and her sister are the same [in the way they
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understand these things]. I think that if she [Cindy] went to a Special
School or Unit it would be just incomprehensible [for both of them].
Having Down’s syndrome is clearly different from the “disadvantages” of being
female, being poor, or belonging to a racial minority—although these are not
necessarily mutually exclusive groups; but the issues discussed above are not
particular to Down’s syndrome. They are more broadly illustrative of the ways in
which assigned group identities tend to ensure that “only the oppressed and
excluded groups are de ned as different” (Young, 1990, p. 170). Within a recogni-
tive justice perspective, difference is differently valued. It “does not imply that there
are not overlapping experiences, or that two groups have nothing in common”
(Young, 1990, p. 171). While Cindy’s learning dis/abilities were assessed at Level
Six, this also became her identity assigned by the school. It is an identity that serves
to accentuate her differences from her peers while her similarities are silenced. In
this respect, Cindy’s story is not unlike that of students with gendered, raced and
classed identities of social disadvantage. The storyteller is generally someone else,
which belies just conditions for self-identity and self-respect that require starting
points for thinking about social arrangements other than the vantage points of the
dominant.
Some would claim equality in that the storyteller is the same for all groups.
That is, the school’s assessment procedures operate under the banner of equality
since everyone is subjected to the same measures even if everyone does not measure
up equally. As Beilharz (1989, p. 93) notes, “to argue in this way is necessarily to
introduce the logic of charity; and the language of the ‘needy’, for there are citizens,
and there are those outside the city gates, who are deserving compassion”—
sentiments echoed by Cindy’s mother. This form of charity—the well-intentioned
but dominant orientations of teachers—threatens Cindy’s self-worth by concentrat-
ing on her learning disabilities and displacing her view of her own identity formed
within her family unit. Cindy herself is aware of her differences but they are
interpreted through an appreciation for relations and processes. Recognitive justice,
then, holds a view of inclusion that begins from the standpoint of the least
advantaged: an “approach [that] attempts to generalise the point of view of the
disadvantaged rather than separate it off” (Connell, 1993, p. 52, emphasis in
original) and thereby change everybody’s sense of self (Fraser, 1995).
Inclusion: recognising education as more than a matter of access
As students with learning disabilities recognise and identify themselves in a positive
way, they acquire the potential to resist their oppression. New energy is created
when people begin to believe in themselves and take more control over their own
lives. Teachers, however, who favour recognitive justice must also address oppress-
ive institutional processes that inhibit the development of their students. As Young
(1990, p. 38) explains:
oppression consists in systematic institutional processes which prevent
some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in
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socially recognised settings, or institutionalized social processes which
inhibit people’s ability to play and communicate with others or to express
their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can
listen.
In my research I was speci cally interested in examining the institutional
processes of schooling within classroom settings and school contexts. I wanted to
know how teachers were implicated in these processes. What can and do teachers
do, for example, to promote the development of their students’ abilities and to
encourage student expressions of their experiences?
Two teachers who collaboratively taught a class of 50 primary school students
related the following account of their efforts to redress the injustices of their
schooling system: injustices meted out to one particular student (Andrew) through
procedures that largely prevented him from developing and utilising his skills and
which inhibited his expression of his feelings. Again, it is an illustration of a student
with a disability—severe cerebral palsy—and some might be tempted to think that
oppression of students from such groups is more likely given the extent of their
reliance on others or at least the extent to which they are portrayed as more reliant.
Certainly, the particular oppression experienced by this student is related to his
disability and the context in which he is located. I imagine that for others, op-
pression would take different forms and substance. However, the following interview
extract should be read  rst as an example of institutional constraint on a student
exercising his capacities and expressing his experiences and then as illustrative of
institutional constraints on particular student capacities and experiences. With this
in mind, I asked these teachers about their experiences of schooling as a constraining
in uence on student development. One teacher began by relating her and her
colleague’s struggle with their institution and its administration to create the condi-
tions necessary for Andrew’s self-development and self-expression:
We felt that this child had every right to communicate with us if he could
do so and he should be given that opportunity. At that stage, all he could
do was give us a yes/no response with his mouth, by the shape of his
mouth. We were knocked back everywhere we went [in our efforts to help
him communicate] and we ended up putting in [funding] submissions
ourselves to various commissions and clubs to get this child a computer—
and the paraphernalia that went with it—so that he could start communi-
cating. That was quite successful [but] it was a lot of work … [Before that]
we had screaming for hours because that was his only way of saying “I’m
angry” … We actually got the  rst computer from a different part of the
school. It was in the library … [I] got myself into quite a bit of trouble …
[I was told by an accomplice within the system’s administration] that if we
wished to get the equipment that this child needed that we had to set
ourselves up and learn to be disliked … [and] that we were going to create
some friction.
Why?
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Well, because you have [challenged] a basic principle. We had one child
who was going to tie up a computer. That computer was in the library and
was accessed by however many hundreds of children. At that time it was
the only Apple Mac[intosh computer] in the school so there was software
that could only be used on that particular computer. When it was brought
up into our room it meant that the access went from 500 down to 50—we
did use it for other children as well at that time. It caused friction. It did
cause friction and there was a mentality, and there still is I think, that
questioned, “Why should all of that money be spent for one child when you
have x number of children in the school?” I can see where that kind of
thinking comes from. I have no trouble identifying with that but at the
same time we had a child here that we felt had the ability to communicate
and [he] wasn’t being given the opportunity to do so. We had a duty of care
to him to let him try to say, “Hey, I’m feeling really sick”, or “Just leave me
alone, give me some time out”. Once we got that [computer] going he
actually voiced those feelings for the  rst time in his life.
One of the  rst things these comments illustrate is how distributive accounts of
social justice—particularly liberal-democratic versions—fall short of ensuring An-
drew’s meaningful inclusion in the educative process. For example, equal oppor-
tunity to communicate with and learn alongside his peers was not facilitated simply
by his presence in the same classroom; access does not automatically deliver
equality. The absurdity of thinking otherwise is stark in this particular situation and
in others has fuelled arguments against inclusive school practices for similar students
with disabilities, errantly in my view. Illustrated more generally is that students,
whatever their differences, do not enter classrooms with the same capacities to
communicate and that classrooms and schooling systems of themselves do not take
account of these differences. Except for “those outside the city gates, who are
deserving compassion” (Beilharz, 1989, p. 93), such arrangements appear quite fair
to those who hold to narrow conceptions of social justice and classroom interactions
“based on the assumptions of homogeneity and uniformity” (Taylor et al., 1997,
p. 151).
A second and related matter that this interview extract raises is the way in which
individuals and institutions utilise social justice discourse, notably liberal-democratic
versions of distributive justice, to maintain unjust social arrangements. It is not fair,
it is argued, to deny the entire school population access to its library computer for
the sake of one student and a few of his peers—the latter, a concession the teachers
offer to dilute the strength of this distributive argument. Neither is it fair, it seems,
to spend disproportionate amounts of money on resources speci cally for the use of
one student. Certainly, material aspects of social justice are important but they
should re ect the outcomes of socially just practices, not drive them. One could just
as readily inquire about the utilisation and redeployment of other resources in the
school although this, too, tends to draw attention to who has what rather than what
is being done to redress the institutional oppression of students. This raises a third
observation, that recognitive justice primarily  nds expression in processes. Lummis
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writes similarly about democracy: “the actuality of democracy itself—the people’s
power—exists while the performance is taking place” (1996, p. 160). Clearly, these
teachers are active in their pursuit of social justice and the inclusion of their
students, not simply in their efforts to acquire needed resources but more broadly in
their “constant and perpetual” struggle to secure the conditions for their student’s
self-development and self-expression. This is how they measure inclusion, not in
whether Andrew has access to the classroom and to a particular computer, even
though these serve the processes of his development.
Inclusion: recognising dialogue and interest engagement as intrinsic to
participation
What is evident here is that students’ self-development and self-expression require
their participation in the educational process. However, what is also clear is that the
participation envisaged by recognitive justice is more than simply accessing opportu-
nities to learn and engage in tasks determined by others. There is nothing intrinsi-
cally libratory or inclusive in such participation. Rather, what counts in inclusive
terms is how participation is determined: through processes that take account of the
interests of all participants or those that serve the interests of dominant groups?
According to Young, “domination consists in institutional conditions which inhibit
or prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions
of their actions” (1990, p. 38). What is required to address such domination are
levels of involvement that are premised on self-determination and that facilitate the
representation of affected interest groups in decision-making processes.
Several parents of students with disabilities interviewed in the research experi-
enced problems in this area with school policies regulating the placement of their
children in particular classes—guidelines for practice that seemed at odds with
government discrimination laws. For parents faced with such discriminatory deci-
sions, “what is annoying is that you have to  ght” the weight of evidence and
research concerning the bene ts of inclusive teaching practices is not always enough
to secure the involvement of parents (and students) alongside teachers in determina-
tions within schools and classrooms. In the end:
They can pull the carpet out [from under my feet] and the only thing
supporting me would be the Disability Act saying that you can’t discrimi-
nate on the basis of the disability. That is the only thing that we’ve got to
 ght with at this stage. I would use it if I had to. I haven’t had to yet. I
would use my research as a weapon. You wouldn’t use that [legal avenue]
until you really had to, but I  nd that most people, once they learn what
you know, they’re willing to change.
This is consistent with commentaries that represent many teachers as unaware of
social justice matters and which suggest that “differential privilege of members of
different … groups is perpetuated in part by the process of schooling” (Young, 1990,
p. 154). Hence, I was particularly interested in the educative attempts or “strategies
of consciousness raising” (Young, 1990, p. 155) employed by parents of students
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with disabilities to secure meaningful participation in school processes that affected
their children, especially where these students were not representative of dominant
groups. One parent, a leader of a self-help group for parents of children with
disabilities, provided the following account of her educative project with teachers:
It is not easy because the teachers are still going through this change as
well. They’re not used to teaching kids who are different and [determining]
how they’re supposed to do it. I can handle that, it doesn’t bother me. If
the teachers are willing to learn, you can sit down together. That’s what we
have done at our school. It wasn’t easy to start with but we have got this
communication going that teachers can come up with good ideas for
[enabling] children [who are different] to be included [in classrooms].
What scares me is … having to start again with the new teacher. The
Special Education teacher has been quite cooperative even though she
hasn’t understood where I am coming from and if she goes I’ll get a new
one and the battle will start over again. There’s no consistency in the
[schooling system] about what we’re doing …
What kind of relationship do you think your fellow parents have with teachers?
It is really hard because what normally happens is that parents have got this
idea of what they want. If they know about inclusion and that’s what
they’ve decided [to pursue], that’s what they want. Most teachers haven’t
heard of it [inclusion]. No, I shouldn’t say [they] haven’t heard of it,
[rather, they] may not agree with it or they’ll do what the Special Edu-
cation teacher tells them and they’ve only been taught [how to teach in]
one way. It can get really confusing and therefore there is an automatic
clash and that usually happens with everyone [every parent] I know.
They’ve had that happen to them. You’ve got to be a very good communi-
cator to get past that and what I tell parents is that you can’t do it alone.
I can go and support another parent and I can feel very con dent I know
what I’m talking about. But when it comes to my child I just break down
and cry. It is such an emotional thing and that’s why you need that support
there when you’re talking to teachers. They’ll come up with all of this
jargon and the other thing that they do to is have one or two extra
educators there. If they know that you’re going to bring three, they’ll take
four. It is a power game: “If we can get more people on side then we’ll
convince them”. These are the games that we’re talking about. That is
what has helped me get to where I am. Most parents say, “I can’t do this”,
and give up and then they do whatever the [schooling system] wants. It is
easier for them and that’s what it boils down to.
There are at least two matters in these comments that warrant our attention.
First, self-determination does not mean separate determination. Notice the struggle
by these parents to rework—rather than abandon—institutional processes. What
should also be understood is that it is unlikely for the dominant to grant self-
determination magnanimously to minority groups. As Frederick Douglas, an
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American slave, once said, power concedes nothing without a struggle. Even if we
agree that the imperative of an inclusive view of social justice is “to generalise the
point of view of the disadvantaged rather than separate it off” (Connell, 1993, p. 52,
emphasis in original), we still have to confront issues of how this might be realised.
Part of what is required is communication and dialogue. This dialogue is both a
precondition for and outcome of the kinds of participatory processes required in a
democracy. It includes the mutual recognition of diverse individuals in public and
private forums where different individuals and groups of people sit down together,
however dif cult that may be at times and however different their voices may sound.
Self-determination is, in part, a collaborative and an educative exercise.
This leads to a second and related observation: socially just processes, ones that
foster self-determination, are necessarily democratic ones. Indeed, “democracy is
both an element and a condition of social justice” (Young, 1990, p. 91). Lummis
records the political virtues of democracy as “the commitment to, knowledge of, and
ability to stand for the whole” (1996, p. 37). None of these include the stand-over
tactics or power games employed in the above example, which include the use of
exclusive language, professional status or the weight of numbers. In relation to the
latter, some may wonder whether democratic processes that rely on the principle of
“one person one vote”—often championed by democrats—can ever deliver social
justice for minority groups, including students with learning disabilities and their
parents. What this deceptive individualisation of the democratic process hides is the
way it works to promote the common interests of dominant groups. But recognitive
justice requires the interests of groups to be represented—not simply the interests of
atomized individuals—and for their views to be seriously engaged within decision-
making processes. This is not just important for the disadvantaged:
Having and exercising the opportunity to participate in making collective
decisions that affect one’s actions or the conditions of one’s actions fosters
the development of capacities for thinking about one’s own needs in
relation to the needs of others, taking an interest in the relation of others
to social institutions, reasoning and being articulate and persuasive, and so
(Young, 1990, p. 92)
All people bene t from such educative processes that maximise the knowledge and
perspectives that contribute to decisions about possible future actions.
Conclusion
Some might be tempted to think that these conditions for inclusive classrooms and
schools have nothing to do with students with learning disabilities. However, I have
attempted to argue that it is no longer morally defensible to treat students with
learning disabilities differently from the way in which we treat other students: that
is, in ways that separate or exclude them not just in a physical sense but also in terms
of the quality of their schooling. Indeed, in some circumstances exclusive schooling
practices actually contribute to these students’ learning disabilities. Similarly, it is
dif cult to justify the moral lessons such practices deliver to students deemed to be
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without learning disabilities. As Connell (1993, p. 15) suggests, “if the school
system is dealing unjustly with some of its pupils, they are not the only ones to
suffer. The quality of education for all the others is degraded.” It is not just the
messages about others that “mainstream” students receive that is of concern but also
the related messages they receive about themselves. Embedded in such messages is
a denial that students who are traditionally “othered” by school systems have
signi cant contributions to make to society—contributions of their own choosing.
Reshaping the moral education of all students in order to render society more
inclusive, then, requires us in the  rst instance to recognise students’ identities—not
those given to them by others, which in the case of students with learning disabilities
tend to be de ned in terms of their disabilities. Broadening out this notion of
identity and involving students and their parents in its construction allows for
differently valued places for students to occupy in classrooms. Being differently
located, students with disabilities also need to be provided with opportunities to
develop their abilities and to express and utilise what they already know and can do.
It is not enough to include students within the same physical spaces. Inclusion is
more concerned with the arrangement of social spaces and the opportunities for
students to explore and develop within these. The interests of all students also need
to be represented within schools, not just the dominant of society. Yet, representing
the interests of students with learning disabilities can be dif cult work. Avoiding the
paternalism of previous eras—in which others claimed to “know best”—would seem
to be not only the goal but also the de ning characteristic of inclusion and a more
defensible moral education for all. This is the challenge that lies ahead.
Correspondence: Dr Trevor Gale, Faculty of Education and Creative Arts, Central
Queensland University, Rockhampton, Queensland 4702, Australia; Fax: 61 (0) 7
4930 9604; e-mail: t.gale@cqu.edu.au
NOTE
[1] This article draws on and reworks parts of Gale, T. & Densmore, K. (2000) Just Schooling:
explorations in the cultural politics of teaching (Buckingham, UK, Open University Press).
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